|
The
propaganda war
and its implications
It was intriguing. The military reportedly expressed fears of the
efforts to revive the communist propaganda tool, the local tabloid
daily, the Visayan Courier. Even Presidential Assistant for Western
Visayas Rafael Coscolluela cited the military insecurity over the
issue, pointing out that it can snow under the propaganda tool with
a lot of information by the government public information arm. Correct,
even assuming that the Courier was a propaganda tool of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, it has only a limited circulation. At
most, 5000. And that is already an exaggeration. The other neutral
outlets of government information number vastly more than that plus
radio and television media.
In short, the military virtually confesses that it fears being
outclassed and outmaneuvered by a bunch of amateurs who dabble also
as journalists on the side.
Look now. All that one has to do is ask government agencies
and instrumentalities how much development projects they have introduced
into a given area. The water here may not be drinkable but, at least,
they provide water for washing to the rural folks. And for farmers.
We don't have to go far. How many kilometers of roads and
bridges have the military engineering battalion put-up in both Negros
provinces. But what about the New People's Army?
And the military can call on the information offices of provincial,
local and national government offices to supply them with the necessary
information that could be dumped on neatral media to counter the
communist propaganda which thrives on specific hyped issues.
Military psy-ops officers should not only focus on what is
being dished out" by their opposite camp. They should the ones to
pick out the subject for public discussion so they can educate the
people on what is being done for them and what has not been done
by the other side.
Not only that. They also have a lot of non-government organizations,
mostly apolitical or democratically-oriented, to help out with their
projects on uplifting the plight of the less privileged segments
of the population.
Look at the problem of communist propaganda. In the Soviet
Union, the Communist Party had almost total control of the media.
Nothing else but community propaganda was approved for dissemination
to the public. But even that failed to stem the collapse of communism.
The whole problem boils down to a lack of appreciation of
what propaganda is and its limitations.
There are a lot of myths about propaganda. And the worst is
that a "lie repeated a thousand times soon becomes the truth." Perhaps,
it should become clearer if the phrase "unless corrected and exposed
as such" is attached to it.
Thus, Presidential Adviser Lito Coscolluela had a point. Why
should the military fall prey to the specter of a tabloid as propaganda
tool of the Communist Party? In short, that's a virtual admission
that the psy-ops of the AFP does not measure up to the level of
CPP/NPA propaganda.
Which is also a myth. Compare the AFP resources to that of
the CPP/NPA. By all the rules of logic, the communist are outclassed
and could be drowned out by the AFP counter-propaganda machine.
The problem is - how come that the perception is that a tabloid
can intimidate the AFP with all the resources of government behind
them.
Every LGU is by itself a counter-propaganda machine. So with
the barangays. Each has its own funds and projects which are, by
themselves, a testimonial to what government is doing for local
residents. So with the provincial government. And each branch of
the various departments of the national government plus the other
ancillary offices, such as the GSIS, the SSS, the Land Bank of the
Philippines, etc.
All that is needed is for the AFP to encourage these agencies
to come out with their plans, projects and programs and their accomplishments.
Compare these with what the CPP/NPA have done to a particular area.
And, voila (you have the insurgents totally snowed under.
But, of course, if the AFP psy-ops operation is misused to
glorify individual soldiers or officers, that's a complete different
story. Still, that still towers over what the CPP/NPA can dish out.
The problem is that the psy-ops officers seem to have developed
a jaundiced view of their work. And the reason for this is obvious.
PIOs of the AFP often are dumped officers. They consider their assignment
as a hard-rock post with no possible advancement at the end. That
was one reason why, while serving as adviser to the Secretary of
National Defense, I suggested that they professionalize the public
information officer's post and put it on record as just another
combat assignments.
Thus, those assigned to such a position need not begrudge
it. A successful PIO can earn promotion as fast as any assigned
to a company or platoon.
One does not necessarily need extra creativity to be able
to run rings around the communist. All that a PIO must do is coordinate
with the various civil government offices around to be able to come
up with counter-propaganda. Say, for example, if a municipal project
involved a village whose population had hardly a drop of potable
water for generations. All that should be done is to point out that
fact. And explain the medical implications of a deep well. And how
many people are benefited by it, plus the children.
I hope our military officers can go over the press releases
of the provincial government during the Martial Law years. And they
can see how the provincial government managed to stem the red tide
by doing nothing but just highlight the truth about what the government
was doing for the people in the countryside and the urban centers.
Nothing can beat the truth.
***
I just received word that former Bacolod Capitol Lions Club
President Rene Cagayanan had died yesterday. His remains are now
at the Alisbo chapel in Mandalagan.
Rene, a land surveyor, proved to be one of the most successful
stewards of the club. He had recently been bed-ridden. But he deserves
a salute from every Lion, especially members of the Bacolod Capitol.
He was a towering figure during his presidency.*
back to top
|